

Introduction

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CIROC (the Centre for Information and Research on Organized Crime) continues to publish its English Newsletters, providing a platform for senior and junior researchers to introduce their research on different aspects of organized crime in the Netherlands and around the world. Over the last decade, CIROC has succeeded in creating and maintaining a wide network of academics and practitioners, which has resulted in a steady stream of up-to-date reports on current research on organized crime. As in previous years, this latest newsletter in English aims to address important questions such as how to better inform the international community about our own ‘Dutch organized crime’ groups and their activities, and how to encourage researchers outside of the Netherlands to contribute to our knowledge.

Following this CIROC tradition, the present issue again includes a wide range of subjects involving various aspects of organized crime. Our colleagues from the UK Georgios Antonopoulos and Alexandra Hall present their research on the black market in steroids, a field in the criminology of organized crime that is getting more and more attention from European scholars. Their article is followed by presentations by a number of Ph.D. candidates focusing on specific forms of organized crime. Tian Ma, a PhD candidate in the DCGC (Doctorate in Cultural and Global Criminology) European Erasmus Mundus programme, herself from China and currently based at Utrecht University, discusses sex trafficking in China. Kim Geurtjens, a PhD candidate at Maastricht University, examines the phenomenon of outlaw motorcycle gangs in the border area between the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. Her presentation is followed by an article by Anna Laskai, another DCGC PhD candidate, who discusses institutional corruption in the medical sector.

A selection of recent publications on organized crime by Dutch criminologists (all members of CIROC) concludes this Newsletter.

Analysis

The Steroids Black Market in the United Kingdom

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Introduction

Steroids are synthetic derivatives mimicking natural hormones that regulate and control how the body develops and maintains itself. Functioning in a similar way to the male hormone testosterone, they can improve endurance and athletic performance, reduce body fat and stimulate muscle growth. Currently, steroids are prescription-only drugs under the UK Medicines Act and they can only be sold by a pharmacist on the presentation of a doctor’s prescription. Without a prescription, steroids are classed as Class C drugs under the Misuse of Drugs

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Act. It is legal to possess or import steroids as long as they are for personal use and as long as the importation is carried out in person. Importation or exportation of steroids for personal use using postal, courier or freight services is illegal. Possessing or importing with intent to supply is illegal and could lead to up to 14 years in prison and an unlimited fine. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, the main aim of this piece is to provide a summarised account of the social organisation of the steroid black market in the UK (a more detailed account can be found in Antonopoulos and Hall, 2016). The research is based on a variety of online and offline sources including a virtual ethnography, a traditional (offline) ethnography conducted in a locale in the Northeast of England with one of the highest rates of steroid use in the UK, data from law enforcement and regulatory agencies - the UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) and Interpol - and a number of published media sources.

Prevalence and Use of Steroids

The figures available estimate only 0.1-0.3% of the population in England and Wales aged 16-59 used steroids in the 12 months prior to the British Crime Survey, whereas the estimated number of people who have used steroids in their lifetime is approximately 271,000, with those 16-24 years old accounting for approximately 52,000 (Home Office, 2013). However, evidence suggests this is a significant underestimate (see Walker, 2015). If focusing solely on those attending gyms, the percentage of use rises dramatically to 20-40% (DrugScope, n.d). Our research, combining all types of data we collected and analysed, identified two general types of steroid users: Occasional users and regular users. The second type of users includes competitive and non-competitive professionals whose sports performance and/or bodily capital is essential for their work, semi-professionals such as unlicensed boxers and ‘bare-knuckle’ fighters, and amateur bodybuilders. There are a number of social, behavioural, environmental and

personal motivations that can contribute to regular steroid use. We came across prisoners who had wanted to ‘bulk up’ as a way of protecting themselves from other inmates. Others regularly used steroids because they enjoyed the admiration they received as a result, which improved their self-esteem. Irrespective of the motivation, during our ethnography in a local gym we found regular steroid use was overwhelmingly embedded in wider cultures of (hyper)masculinity, informal competition among friends, and a collective ‘gym identity’; especially among the core group of gym members, where size and strength was a sign of success over a rival gym. An example of the latter was the competition between two so called ‘meat-houses’ in the wider area of our ethnographic research, who compete along these lines. Winning this informal competition very often leads to work in the local ‘underworld’, since criminal entrepreneurs – drug dealers, illegal traders in tobacco, loansharks, debt collectors – in the area often use these gyms, as well as local fighting competitions, to pool ‘muscle’ for their enterprises.

The Steroid Trafficking Business

In our research we identified highly decentralised entities involved in the trade; entities that may have the same supplier abroad, yet act independently of one another. To a large extent this can be explained by the increasing role played by the Internet, which provides opportunities for dispersed actors to connect and virtually anyone to become a steroid distributor. However, there are hybrid models present, which include both online and offline channels in the same scheme. For example, a case from our research included a gym-owner buying large quantities of steroids from a website, and selling the merchandise to bodybuilders training in his gym and other gyms locally. Gym-owners can often be the link between the offline and online spheres. Overall, we found a number of actors present in the British steroid market:

- Producers: legal pharmaceutical companies and laboratories, and illegal/unlicensed laboratories in the UK and abroad;
- Online Pharmacy Operators: the primary site for steroid supply online;
- Importers: Steroid importers operate on a regular basis. Importers are most often individuals who are linked to the supplement scene or sports scene;
- Middlemen: There are two types of middlemen in the steroid trafficking business that we came across: (a) middlemen who simply connect parts of the business and, specifically, the producers and the importers; (b) middlemen who link parts of the process and are involved in the actual trade of steroids in the UK;
- Retail sellers: There are different types of retail seller supplying steroids across a range of sites:
 - a. offline sellers;
 - b. online sellers;
 - c. user-sellers. There are many instances in which additional ‘layers’ are added to the process of distribution as a result of the large number of individual user-sellers supplying small quantities to friends and acquaintances. User-sellers enjoy a higher status among bodybuilders because they are seen as facilitators of their muscular development and improvement;
 - d. employee-sellers: gym managers or personal trainers who do not use steroids, who are trusted and who, for an extra £10 on average, administer the drug.

Furthermore, a distinction can be made in relation to steroid traffickers along drug versatility-specialisation. A number of individuals involved in the trafficking of steroids are part of a multi-drug enterprise (cocaine, amphetamines and cannabis). There are others, primarily those who are involved in legal businesses in which steroids can be easily distributed (e.g. gyms, supplement shops) that focus exclusively on steroids and other PIEDs. Finally, there is the rather rare case of steroid dealers who also trade in substances that counterbalance the negative side-effects of steroid use, such as erectile dysfunction and mood enhancement medicines.

Distribution of Steroids

The association of steroids with the gym/bodybuilding scene greatly affects offline steroid distribution patterns at the local level. In many of these scenes steroid use is normalised and an inherent part of the socio-cultural landscape. We observed cases involving sellers and prospective customers engaging in a process of trust-building, which includes various stages of information sharing and mentoring. Our research found user-sellers who mentored less-experienced gym members for free, providing advice on training, nutrition and supplements. During the offline ethnography one of the researchers witnessed a gym attendee actively looking for steroids, who had been training for a year and was not satisfied with his progress. In an open conversation about the issue with the gym owner, who was a known steroid trader, a mentor-mentee relationship was forged. Instead of the trader immediately agreeing to provide steroids, a lengthy discussion about exercise patterns, diet and the necessary steps the gym attendee should take before resorting to steroids took place. The mentality and approach of this particular trader is, according to many of the participants we interviewed from the gym/bodybuilding scene, very common in the business, and highlights that not all steroid traders fit the stereotype of a drug entrepreneur who is motivated by profit alone. This process of trust-building allows the steroid trader to manage the risks involved in his illicit steroid business and is often based on a genuine interest in the progress of others.

The nature of online steroid distribution highlights a number of similarities and differences. Our virtual ethnography highlighted that no prior relationship is necessary to obtain steroids online, where buyer and seller never meet and steroids are bought and sold in spaces of relative anonymity; both on the surface web via online pharmacies and on the deep web across a number of darknet sites. As anti-doping policy has shifted and become more punitive, the distribution of PIEDs has moved away from dealers embedded in a sporting sub-culture to a range of ‘non-experts’, which leaves users at greater risk (see Fincoeur et al., 2014). The Internet opens up opportunities for such non-expert suppliers active in the steroid market, offering mechanisms used to target occasional-users or beginners who lack contacts in a local gym culture. In these instances there are a number of risks for online consumers to weigh up. Whereas a local dealer offers face-to-face interaction, possible expertise and an amount of trust-building, initial purchases from online dealers risk consuming products of substandard quality, fraud or identity theft. However, the Internet also offers opportunities for globally dispersed individuals to build relationships and share experiences and knowledge on product types and administration techniques. For example, our research also highlighted virtual relationships being formed on social networking sites, where a certain level of trust was built between buyer and seller over time, which in some respects mimics offline mentoring relationships and distribution patterns we found during the offline ethnography.

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Women for Wives: Sex Trafficking in China

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Sex trafficking was always defined as bringing people across border for the purpose of sexual exploitation. In most scenarios, sex trafficking is used as a mean for recruiting women into prostitution. Whereas in domestic China, alongside with some women are trafficked into the commercial sex industry, majorities are sold for forced marriage.

This article is based on the literature review, observation and interviews of the ongoing PhD project of the author. The project is focusing on the internal migration and crime within China. It is under the framework of DCGC (Doctorate in Cultural and Global Criminology).

In Zhejiang (a coastal province near Shanghai), among 199, 722 women married to the region from other part of China, 35, 994 were related to sex trafficking. That is to say, 18% of the migrant wives in Zhejiang were trafficked and forced, deceived or coerced into their marriage (quoted from an internal report of Zhejiang Police Bureau, 2000). It is estimated that in some regions, 90% of marriages were associated with trafficking. Between 2000 and 2004, more than 42,000 women and children had been rescued nation-wide. In 2009-2011 crackdown campaign by the Ministry of Public Security, 23,085 trafficked women were rescued. However, the lucrative market still exists. The official data recently shows that more than 30,000 women were rescued in 2014 (Legal Daily, 2015, February 16). It is estimated that ten thousand to twenty thousand women are trafficked within China every year (U.S.TIP, 2007).

One Child Policy (OCP) and Male-female Birth Ratio Imbalance

The scarcity of women leads to a relatively high demand for wives through illegal means. And this is largely attributed to the One Child Policy (OCP) and a patriarchal Chinese tradition of boy preference. The Chinese government instituted OCP in 1979. Since then, with the limited chances at parenthood under the OCP, via the help from ultrasound technology, millions families in China have selectively abort their girls to ensure the family has a coveted boy (Tiefenbrun, 2008). Mainly, in this "gendercide", numerous of female infants are disappeared due to the sex-selective abortions. In terms of the birthrate, 120 boys are born for every 100 girls. Moreover, the demographic crisis is especially evident in the countryside. The male population in rural China outnumbered female by 20-40% in 2002. In some regions, the

skews sex ratio could be as stark as 150 to 100 (The Protection Project at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2002). Some of these small rural hamlets have been nicknamed "bachelor villages" for its brimming with aging single men.

In summary, with a huge imbalance in the sex ratio, males, especially those who are poor and in rural areas, are less likely to find a partner. A social breeding ground for trafficking of women for marriage makes the market expanded and lucrative. Therefore, the trafficking of women has brought a very high profit. Rather, human trafficking earns more money than the trafficking of weapons or drugs in China (Tiefenbrun, 2008).

Organized Crime?

Large scale gangs are organized for trafficking women into marriage. Working as an enterprise, they often establish nationwide networks including a complete chain of abduction, transfer, detention and sell to earning significant sums. In this market, women are the commodities been purchased as brides. And abductors are the original suppliers. The recruitment is often through violence, kidnapping, and deceptive employment offers. In most cases, recruiters of human trafficking are not only strangers, some are people the victims known -friends, colleagues and relatives (Yik-yi Chu, 2011). The trafficking gangs offered attractive opportunities, promised employment and money to the young women. They were usually being locked up, closely guarded and watched on the way. In the use force, fraud or coercion, these "bride goods" are trafficked into the destination. There usually have regional distribution of the dealers; provincial, city-level and county-level. In most cases, men come to traffickers to supply them with a wife.

Ethnic minorities living in remote areas are often been targeted by the organized trafficking groups as the potential "bride goods". OCP did not apply to the minorities; hence the share of unmarried young women is higher among the local population in minority concentration regions. Particularly, they are manipulated in the perspective of the traffickers. In the past ten years, the growing numbers of young female migrant population has seemingly created more opportunities for traffickers. Those who came from remote, poor countryside trying to make a living in cities are always targeted by the trafficking gangs with false offers of employment.

In time some gangs transformed into some cartel trafficking organizations and set up matchmaking agencies. Under these circumstance, the boundaries are blurring between the illegal market of sex trafficking and the legalized matchmaking services. For instance, this advertisement typically shows that how they legalized the sex trafficking industry: "this agency has set numerous branches in remote places in Yunan, Guizhou and Sichuan province, and 2000 girls there were encouraged to register with us..." Considering Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan are with higher proportion of minorities, and therefore are the main original sources in the sex trafficking, it is not hard to tell why this advertisement emphasized such statement.

Conclusion

Some trafficked women gradually adapt into the forced marriage, even though they endured great suffering including rape, beating, and torture. However, in some abusive families, the trafficked brides are treated rather as a sex slavery or forced labour (ILO-IPEC, 2002).

So far, it is difficult to have the exact number of the female population who has been exploited in this particular kind of sex trafficking in China. According to the police report, numerous of

trafficked woman are unwilling to be rescued and choose to stay with the husband who bought her. And the restoration of rescued victims found that difficult to be accepted in their original families. They are facing discrimination and even humiliation in the communities upon their release and return home.

In 2015, Chinese government instituted the Two Child Policy aiming to change the demographic crisis in both aging population and the imbalance male-female birth ratio. However, the impact of the OCP for 36 years still haunts. The intensified scarcity of women is not released thereafter. Overall, the organised trafficking groups were still active in the sex exploitation market, playing the role of criminal gangs as well as the legal marriage brokers.

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Outlaw motorcycle gangs in the Meuse-Rhine Euregion

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In recent years, outlaw motorcycle gangs have gained ever-growing attention in the media and in the political arena. However, still little academic research is done on this subject. Moreover, most of the existing research on outlaw motorcycle gangs focuses on the situation in the United States, Canada or Australia. This research aims to describe the role of the border for the organization and (criminal) activities of outlaw motorcycle gangs in the Meuse-Rhine Euregion, as well as the cross-border approach to this phenomenon by authorities.

The outlaw biker phenomenon

Though originally founded in the United States, the outlaw motorcycle gang phenomenon has since its start - roughly after the Second World War - expanded globally. Prominent US-based outlaw clubs such as the Hells Angels MC, Bandidos MC and Outlaws MC now have more chapters outside of the United States than in the United States (Barker, 2011: p. 213). In addition, indigenous outlaw clubs have been established elsewhere in the

second half of the 20th century, such as Satudarah MC in the Netherlands and Gremium MC in Germany. These EU-based outlaw clubs have now also expanded their sphere of influence in other continents.

At first, outlaw clubs were seen as a group of deviant rebels who would not conform to the standards of mainstream society, a brotherhood of like-minded individuals who share a passion for motorcycles and occasionally end up in a brawl after having one too many (Wolf, 1991; Quinn & Koch, 2003). Over the years this image has changed. Nowadays, outlaw clubs are primarily seen (at least by the government) as hierarchically structured criminal organizations, which are involved in – among other things – transnational, organized crime (Barker, 2005; Lauchs, Bain & Bell, 2015). Because of their international character and several criminal cases, outlaw clubs are generally assumed to be involved in the large-scale production and transport of drugs, arms, of maintaining prostitution enterprises and of using their dangerous and unpredictable public image as means to intimidate legal businesses, merging the licit and the illicit worlds (Quinn & Koch, 2003; Politie Landelijke Eenheid, 2014).

Despite the fact that no academic consensus exists on the question whether outlaw clubs can be considered as inherently criminal organizations or whether the clubs consist of some ‘rotten apples’ (Lauchs e.a., 2015), research based on police data has shown that over 80% of the - as such - identified outlaw bikers in the Netherlands and Denmark have a criminal record and many are repeat offenders (Blokland, Soudijn & Teng, 2014; Klement, respectively). It may therefore be said that outlaw bikers are above average criminally active and deserve extra attention from criminologists.

Euregional context

Because of the international character of outlaw clubs, the large expansion of the prominent as well as indigenous outlaw clubs and the presumption of transnational organized crime, the Meuse-Rhine Euregion is a potentially interesting place for outlaw bikers to settle. Geographically the region consists of the Belgian provinces of Limburg and Liège, the southern part of the Dutch province of Limburg and the western part of the German federal state of North Rhine Westphalia. Due to the location (centered in-between some highly urbanized areas, the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and the European mainland) and the many national borders, it could be argued that the Meuse-Rhine Euregion may be potentially interesting for criminal outlaw bikers, as they may benefit from the freedom of movement and favourable arrangements in the different countries while national borders may limit jurisdiction, competences and information sharing among authorities.

Some especially violent incidents in the Euregion such as the murder of several Hells Angels nomads in Oirsbeek in 2004 (Netherlands), the triple murder of Outlaws in Maasmechelen in 2011 (Belgium), the murder of an 18-year old member of the Hells Angels in Würselen in 2015 (Germany) and another fight with shots fired between the Hells Angels, Red Devils and the recently settled Bandidos in Sittard in 2015 (Netherlands) have gained broad media coverage, sparking law enforcement and administrative authorities to once again to take a firm stance against outlaw bikers.

Government responses

Such a firm stance not only encompasses the criminal law approach to arrest and convict criminal outlaw bikers, but also requires a complementary administrative approach to discourage outlaw bikers to establish more clubs, to ensure credibility of

the risky sectors in which outlaw motorcycle gangs operate and a fiscal approach to identify illegally acquired revenues. An integrated, or multi-agency approach like the abovementioned already exists as an overarching policy against organized crime in the Netherlands. To improve the information sharing between judicial, police, administrative and fiscal authorities, regional information and expertise centers (RIECs) have been established in the Netherlands. Belgium has similar administrative tools to deter outlaw motorcycle gangs, though these are fragmented into different laws. Due to stricter privacy legislation, information sharing is more difficult compared to the Netherlands. In Germany, mainly the police are tasked with tackling outlaw motorcycle gangs. Unique to the administrative approach here is the possibility to ban local chapters or entire clubs (as happened in the case of Satudarah MC). Neither Belgium nor the Netherlands has previously succeeded in banning outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Recently, a Benelux working group has called for more Euregional cooperation regarding outlaw motorcycle gang related crime (van Laarhoven, 2016). In the context of this research, it is interesting to see whether new initiatives will develop in the Meuse-Rhine Euregion, adding to the already existing cooperation structures and personal cross-border ties.

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Do no harm: from individual persuasion to organizational pervasion, and the institutional corruption of the medical profession

Anna Eszter Laskai (Willem Pompe Institute, Utrecht University)

Introduction

The fundamental principle in medicine is to do no harm. Despite being entrenched in the basis of medical practice, and the origin of medicine's authority, autonomy, and claim to trust, instances of intentional harm to patients still happen. In medicine, harming patients intentionally is dealt under the subject of medical malpractice. Criminological research into professional misconduct and occupational criminality belongs to the area of white collar crime studies: looking at trusted individuals in society who use their status, power, or occupational advantages to commit crimes for personal benefit, exploiting societal trust that their positions provide. Medical malpractice, which covers behaviour from gross negligence to direct intent to harm, is not however the only manifestation of criminality in medicine. In 2014 drug manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline was found guilty of bribing doctors in China to prescribe its products and was fined a record \$490 million USD. (Bradsher and Buckley, New York Times, 2014) But what about the doctors involved? They accepted the bribes, and may have prescribed GSK products, yet these doctors have evaded scrutiny or criticism for involvement. Where the ethics of medicine in this instance and what does this mean for the institutional corruption of medical practice? Is this a single case of rogue doctors, and should they even be held accountable? Is there more at stake than just a case of a few "bad apples?"

Distortion of medical ethics

Braithwaite, in his study on Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (1984), revealed the crimes rampant within the pharmaceutical sector – from paying kickbacks and bribes to doctors to prescribe their products, manipulating clinical trial data, hiring ghost writers to publish favourable articles, concealing evidence of harmful drug reactions, to engaging in fraudulent marketing practices. "...the pharmaceutical industry has a worse record of international bribery and corruption than any other industry, a history of fraud in the safety testing of drugs, and a disturbing record of criminal negligence in the unsafe manufacture of drugs." Braithwaite saw not evil individuals, but organizational qualities as conductors of corporate criminality. Organizational morality (Lippens, 2001) proposes that organizations are highly complex networks that operate under an organizationally defined culture, imposing on its members a set of norms and behavioural expectations designed to further the attainment of organizational goals at all costs – deviance located not in the mind of the individual but in the fabric of everyday organizational behaviour. For profit driven organizations, such as pharmaceutical companies, the duty to shareholders supersedes any other interest, creating a scenario in which the duty of financial increment produces goal-attaining conduct that pushes the boundaries of what is regarded as right or legal. This organizational phenomenon of deviation from moral or legal modus operandi is described by the process of Institutional Corruption.

Institutional Corruption as manifests when there is a "systematic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical that undermines the institution's effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose, or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose", weakening the public's trust in, or the trustworthiness of the institution (Lessing, 2013). Focusing on the pharmaceutical

industry, institutional corruption studies analyse how pharmaceutical companies distort the practice of medicine in that an increasing outsourcing of funding for activities vital to the medical profession to industry, has handed an undue amount of control over to companies in defining how medical knowledge is pursued. The pharmaceutical industry funds, conducts, and controls the majority of clinical trials, owns clinical trial results and decides on extent of disclosure, provides information on drug benefits to physicians and patients, finances medical conferences, continuing medical education, and medical journals, and evaluates drugs on the market. (Rodwin, 2012) The pervasion of financial dependencies on industry has since been scrutinized in that medicine no longer maintains exclusive control over its profession. To secure finances vital to progress and practice, the medical profession must succumb its professional principles to industry interests. This phenomenon is most commonly described as subconsciously swaying the impartial judgment of doctors in their daily practice, however Götzsche (2013) states that this is not simply a question of flawed professional judgment, but a direct contribution by the medical profession to the illegalities of pharmaceutical companies.

Undue influence is acknowledged to some degree by those willing to self-criticize, yet explanations of physicians furthering industry interests are explained by 1: the omnipresence of human greed and 2: individual wrongdoers. Although not disregarded, such explanations are inadequate, focusing on scapegoat persons rather than root causes. The GSK case is exemplary, and provides the base of the argument for the analysis of the institutional corruption of the medical profession. Should a doctor who takes a bribe a corrupt individual with flawed morals, or is behaviour a product weakened ethical principles of the profession itself? Since industry has permeated almost every activity of medicine, is it sufficient to explain corruption of medical principles as an individual lapse of judgment? Financial ties between industry and medicine have become not only acceptable, but an elementary feature in medicine. Constant contact, routine interaction, and necessitated partnerships between industry and medicine should be studied from an organizational perspective, analysing the stability of medical principles and ability of medical interests to claim precedent in a relationship of competing interests. Blaming and removing a single physician for deviant conduct, will not change nor provide explanation for normalization of corrupt practices in medicine.

Conclusion

The processes of the institutional corruption of medicine should be the point of focus, research aimed at describing the institutional cultural dynamics behind decisions to deviate from good practice. Whether contributors to industry criminality or victims mislead, we must seek answers that go beyond the calculating mind, and consider the process of distortion of medical principles and how this contributes to a heightened probability of doing harm in medical practice. The question under analysis should focus on whether industry-medicine relationships are detrimental to the principles of medicine as a whole. What explanations surface for the weakening of medical ethics? Are the traditional institutional principles of medicine able to maintain authority over the practice of medicine as a gatekeeper to human health or have they been perverted in environment saturated with private interests?

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
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