

## Introduction

*Dina Siegel (Utrecht University)/CIROC*

In this issue of the CIROC Newsletter, the reader will find a number of articles based on on-going and/or completed research on organised crime conducted by criminologists in the Netherlands. Four different subjects are discussed here: firstly, the involvement of organised crime in cross-border marriages in Europe by Julia Rushchenko, Ukrainian PhD candidate of the Erasmus Mundus Programme of four universities (Kent, Elte Budapest, Hamburg and Utrecht). The second research project presented here was carried out by Henk van de Bunt and his research team from the Erasmus University Rotterdam on the Extra Secure Institution (EBI) in the Netherlands, which houses infamous organised crime figures and other prisoners who pose an extreme flight risk. The third article, written by Dutch PhD candidate Joep Rottier (Utrecht University), takes us to New Zealand, eleven years after prostitution was decriminalised in this country. The fourth article brings us back to the Netherlands. Richard Staring from the Erasmus University Rotterdam discusses the recent research he and his research team conducted on the risk of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults and the potential danger to Dutch society inherent in such a process.

In the section Book Reviews, Edwin Kruisbergen, a criminologist at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, reviews a recently published book by Professor Emeritus Cyrille Fijnaut, one of the country's leading criminologists. The review focuses on Fijnaut's overview and analysis of developments in research on organised crime.

As usual, the Newsletter also provides a list of new publications on organised crime by CIROC researchers.

## Analysis

### Tackling organized crime or defending family rights? Different approaches in the UK and Germany towards policing marriage migration

*Julia Rushchenko, Ph.D. candidate, DCGC, Utrecht University and Hamburg University*

In the framework of my PhD project dedicated to cross-border marriages in Germany, the issue of policing marriage migration carried out by the state caught my attention. While interviewing bi-national couples, I noticed that in some cases certain measures are being taken in order to determine whether a marriage is "fake" or "bona fide". Furthermore, the EU states do not have a common approach in implementing these policies; in recent years some states have been turning towards a punitive perspective, whereas others maintain a more relaxed vision of the problem.

Policing marriage migration is deeply interwoven with the way the state approaches questions of citizenship and immigration policy. Until recently international migration theory has paid scant attention to the role of states in causing, controlling and shaping migrant flows (Aleinikoff 2011: 267). Policing marriage migration is defined and determined by the prevalent state's vision of migration control, or, in other words, by the holistic idea of who is welcome in the country and who is not. Marriage migration control can be executed at three levels: the preventive level (through the actions of the civil registrar), the repressive level (through the practice of annulment) and through a possible criminal conviction leading to a fine or a term in prison (Foblets & Vanheule 2006).

Besides being perceived as "gold-diggers" by relatives and social circle,

## CONTENT

- ◆ Introduction
- ◆ Analysis:
  - Tackling organized crime or defending family rights? Different approaches in the UK and Germany towards policing marriage migration
  - Imprisoned in the EBI
  - Eleven years of decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand. The important role of the New Zealand Prostitutes' Collective
  - Risks of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults?
- ◆ Book Review
- ◆ New publications on organized crime

non-EU spouses from economically weak countries are often stigmatized by the immigration authorities via intrusions into the personal intimate family space, including separate interrogations and cross-checks. The process of investigation of whether a marriage is "fake" or "genuine" sometimes involves the interrogation of neighbours, a search of personal belongings with the goal of finding any proof of whether the marriage is indeed "bona fide", such as signs of actual cohabitation, intimate correspondence, wedding pictures and other wedding attributes (rings, dresses, gifts) etc. A similar investigation can also be initiated based on an anonymous denunciation to the police that the marriage was fraudulent.

There have been attempts by the European Union to formulate a set of criteria that would allow the immigration authorities to judge the authenticity of a marriage. According to European Council Resolution 07/C 382/01 of 4 December 1997 on measures to be adopted on the combating of marriages of convenience, the following factors may provide grounds for believing that a marriage is one of convenience: 1) the fact that matrimonial cohabitation is not maintained, 2) the lack of an appropriate contribution to the responsibilities arising from the marriage, 3) the spouses have never met before their marriage, 4) the spouses are inconsistent about their respective personal details, 5) the spouses do not speak a language understood by both, 6) a sum of money has been handed over in order for the marriage to be contracted (with the exception of money given in the form of a dowry in the case of nationals of countries where the provision of a dowry is common practice), 7) the past history of one or both of the spouses contains evidence of previous marriages of convenience or residence anomalies.

However, although the European Council's resolution is one of the core documents on dealing with "bogus" marriages, the way marriage migration is framed and governed differs greatly between the Member States. In Germany, the topic of police investigations of the private life of bi-national families has received wide coverage by journalists and human rights activists after a German-Turkish couple, following an investigation by the immigration authorities, brought their case to the court in Bremen. The Alien's Office decided that it was a typical "sham marriage", because it allegedly found some disparities and inconsistencies in the answers of the spouses. In search of justice, the couple's lawyer further maintained that interrogations and searches of the couple's home violated their fundamental right to privacy and "informational self-determination" (Gösner 2012).

A media discourse analysis of Internet-based newspapers and other

materials in the German language regarding “*Scheinehe*” made it clear that this issue has lately been discussed in Germany in relation to human rights, campaigns for the rights of undocumented migrants and the integration of immigrants (particularly the concept of “*Willkommenskultur*” – welcoming culture). The questions posed to the couples during interrogation (e.g. Who sleeps on the left side of the bed? Does your spouse bring you gifts?) as well as the whole concept of surveillance of the intimate sphere by the immigration authorities are sharply criticized (Dernbach 2012; Havlicek 2010). Moreover, in the German mass media as well as in the materials presented by lawyers and NGOs that support immigrants, a “sham” marriage is often called a “*Schutzeh*”, which means “protection marriage”. This term describes a situation in which a German citizen who feels sympathetic towards a non-EU person without a valid residence permit, agrees to marry this non-EU citizen in order to save him/her from deportation or having an undocumented status. Criticism of the policing of marriage migration is not limited to mainstream mass media and human rights campaigners. The recently released documentary “*Werden Sie Deutscher*” (2013) provides a moralizing portrayal of investigations by the state while also narrating the story of a Bangladeshi immigrant who is married to a German woman. It is recognized that protection of national boundaries can hinder family life when a punitive approach towards marriage migration is adopted.

This perspective stands in contrast to mass media and government rhetoric regarding “marriages of convenience” in the UK, where investigations into “sham” marriages are viewed exclusively in relation to criminalization and organized crime. This could be explained by the fact that in recent years a large number of Eastern European, Pakistani and Indian gangs supplying brides and grooms to non-EU nationals in order to obtain indefinite residence permits, have been prosecuted by the authorities. It is emphasized that “sham” marriages could be carried out on three levels: individual, local and international, i.e. via criminal networks involved in multiple and highly lucrative immigration offences (Vine, 2013). Not only does the UK Border Agency regularly report on the apprehension of international gangs, but it also mentions the names of individuals involved, provides pictures of convicts and indicates the measures of punishment. For instance, it is stated regarding a recent case that “a gang of 18 behind a sham marriage scam stretching from Yorkshire to Pakistan have been jailed for a total of nearly 28 years” (UK Border Agency, 2013).

Besides regularly reporting on its success in cracking down on immigration offenders via the press and in official documents replete with statistics, the UK Border Agency also encourages UK residents to participate in crime detection by collaborating with the officials. Visitors to the Border Agency’s website find the following explicit message: “Anyone with information about immigration crime can contact Crimestoppers on 0800 555 111 anonymously or visit their website Crimestoppers”. It is clear that the UKBA tackles irregular migration through close cooperation with the registrars. The latter adopt a proactive role in detecting more and more suspicious cases of brides and grooms allegedly taking part in “sham” marriages to circumvent immigration and asylum rules (Wandsworth Council). The following quote by Mark Harper, a UK immigration minister, exemplifies very well the current stance towards policing marriage migration: ‘Immigration crime is not victimless. The gangs involved in this activity often have links to serious organized crime and it places huge pressure on the public purse at a time when the country can least afford it. [...] The message to those involved is clear. We will catch you and we will not hesitate to take the strongest possible action’ (UK Border Agency, 2013). Therefore, the emphasis is placed on detecting immigration offenders connected to organized crime, and policing marriage migration is represented as a political issue linked to the threats of irregular migration and welfare fraud. Unlike the situation in Germany, the human rights perspective is very rarely mentioned, which goes in line with the recent rise of Euroscepticism and hostility towards European human rights mechanisms such as the European Convention on Human Rights.

#### References:

Aleinikoff Aleksander. 2011. “Policing Boundaries: Migration, Citizenship, and the State”. In *E Pluribus Unum?: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. // Ed. by Gerstle, G. and Mollenkopf, J. Russel Sage Foundation.  
Council Resolution 97/C 382/01 of 4 December 1997 on measures to

be adopted on the combating of marriages of convenience, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/other/l33063\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33063_en.htm)  
D’Aoust, Anne-Marie. 2010. “Circulation of Desire. The Security Governance of the International “Mail-Order Brides” Industry”, // In *Security and Global Governmentality: Globalization, Governance and the State*, Ed. by Miguel de Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet.  
Dernbach, Andrea. 2012. “Scheinehe: Lauschangriff aufs Ehebett“. Der Tagesspiegel, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/scheinehe-lauschangriff-aufs-ehebett/6732628.html> 014  
Europol, 2014. “Human Trafficking Gang Jailed”, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/human-trafficking-gang-jailed>  
Foblets, Marie. & Vanheule, Dirk. 2006. “Marriages of Convenience in Belgium: the Punitive Approach Gains Ground in Migration Law”. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 8(3-4), 263-280.  
Gerds-Schiffler, Rose. 2012. “Kritik an Ausländerbehörde reißt nicht ab“, Weser Kurier, [http://www.weser-kurier.de/bremen/politik2\\_artikel1-Kritik-an-Auslaenderbehoerde-reisst-nicht-ab\\_arid,292692.html](http://www.weser-kurier.de/bremen/politik2_artikel1-Kritik-an-Auslaenderbehoerde-reisst-nicht-ab_arid,292692.html)  
Gösner, Rolf. 2012. “Peinliche Ausforschung der Privatsphäre. Scheinehe-Ermittlung gegen Binationale Ehepaare”. Grundrechte Report Beitrag. <http://ilmr.de/2013/ilmr-informiert-grundrechte-report-2013-soeben-erschienen>  
Havlicek, Teresa. 2010. “Echtheit der Ehe auf dem Prüfstand”, Taz.de, <http://www.taz.de/!62924/>  
Vine, John. 2013. A Short Notice Inspection of a Sham Marriage Enforcement Operation. <http://icsinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/An-Inspection-of-a-Sham-Marriage-Enforcement-Operation-Web-PDF.pdf>  
UK Border Agency, 2013. “International Sham Marriage Gang Jailed” <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/international-sham-marriage-gang-jailed>

#### Imprisoned in the EBI

Prof. Dr. Henk van de Bunt, Erasmus University Rotterdam/CIROC

During the eighties and nineties of the last century the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands changed. The number of drug trafficking offences increased considerably and the sentences for this type of organized crime became more severe. A consequence of this development was that the Dutch Prison Service found itself confronted with a new category of prisoners, who were serving long prison sentences and were eager to escape. Following several violent breakouts in the early 1990s, the housing of prisoners who posed a flight risk and/or a risk to society was concentrated in a special prison facility. This facility, the Extra Secure Institution (EBI), was established in 1993, with a capacity of 26 prison cells. The EBI is designed to house prisoners who (1) pose an extreme flight risk and an unacceptable risk to society because of the danger of recidivism for serious violent offences, or (2) pose an unacceptable risk to society if they escape from detention, but the risk of flight as such is of secondary importance. This involves situations where the escape of the prisoner would lead to serious societal or political unrest. Since its inception in 1993, the EBI has delivered on its promise to secure the specific target population entrusted to its care. Not one prisoner has escaped from the EBI since 1993. The main objective of the EBI has thus been achieved. The question is at what price this effectiveness is being achieved. The question is warranted given that the EBI’s strict security precautions have given rise to controversy and criticism from the outset. Against this background, the Ministry of Security and Justice commissioned a study to examine the functioning of the EBI and, more specifically, the various ‘costs’ of the institution’s regime.

#### Approach and research methods

In order to answer our research questions we used various methods and studied a range of sources. We interviewed 40 persons in 35 interviews: policy makers who were instrumental in setting up the EBI, current and former EBI employees and current and former EBI prisoners. We also studied the daily and monthly reports on current and former EBI prisoners. In addition, we obtained key figures on, among other things, the number of staff employed, the costs of EBI cells, the number of pris-

oners and the length of their stay, the number of internal sanctions and measures, and the number of complaint cases. To this end, we used the data sources made available by the EBI. To examine the legal position of EBI prisoners we used the customary juristic methods and sources, such as regulations and jurisprudence. Finally, we used several other research methods and sources, such as attending staff meetings; conducting informal conversations with prison staff and detainees; observing the work routines and interactions between prison staff and detainees; and studying the research literature, policy documents and parliamentary documents.

#### *Strict rules and a maximum of surveillance*

The establishment of the EBI with its maximum security level went against the trend in modern penitentiary history described by the Dutch criminologist Herman Franke of encouraging self-control and personal responsibility among detainees, as is the case with 'half-open' prisons. The prisoners in the EBI are kept in line not by self-control, but by extreme external control. They are left in no doubt that any attempt at escape will be futile. Although a shift can be observed in the enforcement of the strict and limited EBI regime, this regime remains unique in the Netherlands. A prisoner's stay in the EBI is governed by a large number of norms, some of which apply to penitentiary institutions in general, while others specifically apply to the EBI. Existing legislation provides for far-reaching powers of the prison director and restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the detainees. The EBI regime is further defined by the way in which these powers are being put to use. Some elements of the regime, such as systematic searches and the absence of any possibility to talk to life partners and close relatives without a glass partition, have since been adjusted. However, the regime is restrictive and it entails far-reaching limitations on various basic rights, such as the right to privacy, family life and physical integrity. The restrictions on contact with the outside world constitute the most difficult aspect of life in the EBI.

#### *Working in the EBI*

Characteristics of working in the EBI include the specific nature of the target population and a regime that is different to that of other facilities within the prison system. Safety and control are the key words of the regime and the daily activities are governed by rules and routines. The life of the prisoners as well as the duties of the prison staff are structured according to set patterns. All through the day there are all sorts of monitoring and control activities during which various challenges present themselves, such as staying alert while interacting with detainees. When the daily routine is interrupted by the recalcitrant behaviour of a prisoner, staff members are faced with the challenge of responding in an adequate manner.

While safety and control are central to the regime, the development of humanization has increasingly become prevalent in the EBI. This trend has taken hold not only in the physical prison environment – architectural choices, furnishings, carpeting, upholstery –, but also in the treatment of detainees by prison staff. Humanization is often deployed as a means to increase security. This concept is known as 'dynamic security'.

Staff members are expected to treat the prisoners humanely and be sensitive to their personal circumstances. All the same, there is mutual suspicion and distrust. The prison staff expresses suspicion and distrust of the prisoners in a variety of ways. Conversely, they are treated with suspicion and distrust by the detainees. All this leads to a vicious circle in the communication between staff and detainees: there is no contact because there is distrust, and because there is no contact, there is distrust, despite all the good intentions of dynamic security and humanization. As far as the immaterial personal costs are concerned, the question is whether staff in the EBI are more often confronted with violence or other undesirable behaviour, which might – sooner or later – affect their psychological or physical well-being. This does not appear to be the case: working in the EBI is not perceived as being more difficult or demanding than working in other prison regimes. Various other factors, such as the long periods of employment, the low level of sick leave, the expressions of job satisfaction and the relative safety in the workplace, indicate that there are no specific costs attached to working in the EBI. However, the financial operating costs of the EBI have turned out to be

considerably higher than those of other facilities, in contrast to costs that are less easy to express in terms of money, such as the safety, health and job satisfaction of the prison staff.

#### *Being detained in the EBI*

In 1958 Gresham Sykes published a study of the situation of prisoners in a maximum security prison in New Jersey. He described the different types of pain that prisoners feel as a consequence of their imprisonment: the pain of the loss of freedom and the feeling of having become a social outlaw (1958: 65), the lack of important necessities of life, such as sexual relationships and important goods and services, the loss of autonomy and the loss of security.

The 'pains of imprisonment' described by Sykes are very recognizable and are used by many researchers. The EBI is an outstanding example of a prison that deprives detainees of a great deal of freedom and autonomy. The loss of security certainly applies in the EBI. However, Sykes's five pains of imprisonment do not provide a sufficiently sharp picture of what EBI prisoners feel. It emerged from our interviews that they mainly suffer from the infringement of their intimacy, a cause of pain that was not formulated by Sykes. They suffer from the tension between the lack of privacy to which they are subjected (every little thing they do is registered outside the cell) and the secrecy with which the staff shroud their actions. As a result of the many restrictions imposed on their contacts with the world outside the EBI, the detainees find it difficult to maintain social relations with family members, spouses and friends. They live in an artificial, low-stimulus environment and say that this is having both a physical and psychological impact on them.

Other important causes of pain concern visiting arrangements, more specifically the restrictions that are put into force when prisoners receive visitors without being behind glass, and the body searches. Although the current use of body searches is less controversial than the practice of systematic body searches in the early years of the EBI, being subjected to a body search is still a humiliating experience for prisoners.

The staff may distrust the prisoners, but the prisoners also distrust the prison staff. This distrust mainly concerns the way in which staff handle information. The prisoners have no idea what the staff members know about them and what is being done with this information. The prisoners are unsure about the role that their behaviour (good or bad) in detention plays in extension decisions. They do not know what course they should steer to stay out of the danger zone of an extension. This can result in them keeping their cards close to their chest when dealing with guards to prevent them from finding out about their actual circumstances.

In addition to the distrust between detainees and personnel, there is also mutual distrust between prisoners. Incidents from the past have shown that escalations can have serious consequences. Because staff members only have limited opportunity to intervene, prisoners can often feel left to the tender mercies of their fellow-prisoners and their own devices. The feeling of insecurity within the EBI is also a major cause of pain for prisoners.

Despite these 'costs' of a stay in the EBI for prisoners, the EBI regime also has several positive side-effects. These concern the strict checks for contraband and the regular rhythm imposed by the regime. It is practically impossible for EBI detainees to obtain access to drugs and alcohol. Together with the strict regime that is conducive to a regular daily pattern, this can make a positive contribution to detainees' general state of health. The management data of PI Vught show that the average EBI prisoner is relatively healthy in comparison to other detainees. It would seem that EBI prisoners make relatively little use of medical and psychological care. To put this into perspective, it should be noted that the aforementioned distrust towards care providers and the supervisory measures that accompany a consultation may deter detainees from using the services of care providers. Detainees also have more time and peace and quiet available to spend on a hobby or on preparing themselves for their hearing.

#### *The EBI in balance? Conclusions and recommendations*

In the past twenty years, the EBI has proven its right to exist compared to other closed facilities. There have been no hostage situations or break-outs in the EBI, while prisoners in other institutions have made attempts

to escape, some of which have been successful. The question is whether or not it is 'overkill': are prisoners being subjected to certain restrictions unnecessarily or is too much importance being attached to security interests, i.e. the prevention of breakouts, when this is being accomplished at the expense of other interests? When has the ceiling been reached with regard to taking measures to prevent breakouts? At the end of the day, the answer to such questions is based on normative/political considerations, for which this study can only contribute the building blocks.

#### *Gevangen in de EBI.*

*Een empirisch onderzoek naar de extra beveiligde inrichting (EBI) in Vught.*

*Auteurs: Henk van de Bunt, Edwin Bleichrodt, Sanne Struijk,*

*Pascale de Leeuw en Dieneke Struik. Boom, Den Haag 2013*

#### **Eleven years of decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand. The important role of the New Zealand Prostitutes' Collective**

*Joep Rottier, PhD candidate, Utrecht University*

In 2003, the New Zealand Parliament accepted the Prostitution Reform Act, which decriminalised prostitution. Decriminalisation meant a repeal of all laws against prostitution. Prostitution became recognised as legitimate service work and sex workers were now able to operate under the same legal rights as any other occupational group. The key difference between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there are no prostitution-specific regulations imposed by the state (Mossman, 2007). Looking at the Dutch legalisation policy of voluntary prostitution for example, unlike New Zealand, prostitution-specific regulations are effective, and more are being considered by the government to improve control over the sex industry.

New Zealand's decriminalisation of prostitution was a historic moment for the New Zealand Prostitutes' Collective (NZPC). Without its impressive efforts, the Prostitution Reform Act might not have been realised (Sanders, O'Neill, & Pitcher, 2011, Abel, Fitzgerald, & Healy, 2010, Weitzer, 2012).

#### *The historical background of the NZPC*

The New Zealand Contagious Diseases Act of 1869 created a distinction between prostitutes and other poor working-class women, as well as a double standard of morality because of the one-way accusatory nature of the law: only prostitutes were required to be checked for venereal diseases, while there were no rules for men (Macdonald, 1986, Jordan, 2010). This androcentric strategy towards sex workers continued over the course of the twentieth century. The injustice of this attitude was one of the main driving forces for the establishment in 1987 of a collective for all New Zealand sex workers, the NZPC. Its ultimate goal was the decriminalisation of prostitution, as a result of which the image of prostitution could shift from 'sex as sin' to 'sex as work', i.e. a farewell to the double standard of morality. The structure of the NZPC needed to be open, meaning no registration obligation for members, and the arguments about the realities of sex work needed to be evidence-based, for which the NZPC approached academic institutions for help (Barnett, Healy, Reed, & Bennachie, 2010).

#### *The role of the NZPC in the decriminalisation of prostitution*

In keeping with the social liberal nature of the country, with its focus on human rights and freedom of choice, the NZPC received the support of governmental and non-governmental organisations, politicians, the media and the public. At first, however, working together with the police and the justice system did not always contribute to the NZPC's objectives. Sex workers were reluctant to speak frankly about their issues for fear of being arrested or having their children removed from their care.

An important chance to prove the importance of the NZPC's existence was offered by the New Zealand Department of Health, when it asked the organisation to participate in the National Council on AIDS and to set up and run an HIV prevention program in the sex industry. The annual NZ \$50,000 government funding could be seen as a sign that politicians regarded a sex worker-driven organisation as a valid holder of public funds. In 1988, the NZPC introduced its national 'safe-sex'-programme.

The NZPC's first submission for decriminalisation to the Select Committee on Justice and Law Reform in 1989 gained national media attention. NZPC's frustration regarding the continuing police raids against sex workers also got wide public attention. On the one hand, the NZPC was expected to provide condoms to sex workers as part of their HIV prevention programme, while on the other hand, these condoms were being seized by the police as evidence that sex work had taken place, with the consequence that sex workers were being arrested for prostitution-related offences. In response to this, the NZPC threatened to refuse further funding from the Department of Health and successfully called for an interdepartmental committee to investigate reforms of the existing prostitution laws (Healy, Bennachie, & Reed, 2010). The awareness of a double standard in prostitution-related laws increased during the 1990s. The NZPC managed to build up a strong national profile and attract a broad base of support for law reform measures.

#### *Supporters and opponents*

The NZPC reform plans were supported by sex workers, human rights groups, public health experts, progressive religious/rationalist groups and women's organisations. They were convinced that decriminalisation, and thereby abandoning the moral approach, could lead to improvement of sex workers' human rights and health, to harm minimisation, to a safer sex industry, an easier profession exit for prostitutes (if they wanted to), and elimination of the double standard approach. Both conservative and liberal politicians were interested in elements of the intended law reform. In 1994, with the help of lawyers and academics, the NZPC presented a decriminalisation law model, parts of which were later incorporated into the text of the final Prostitution Reform Bill (PRB).

Resistance came from Christian fundamentalists as well as national and international anti-sex feminist groups. They campaigned against the NZPC and against all proposals for the decriminalisation of prostitution, arguing that prostitution was an indicator of gender inequality and female suppression. Together with the international Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), they pleaded for the criminalisation of prostitution. Resistance also came from the sector itself. Some operators feared reports of mistreatment and possible prosecution for brothel keeping or staff influencing. Some parlour owners expressed a preference for regulated legislation, as opposed to decriminalisation (Barnett et al., 2010, Healy et al., 2010, Laurie, 2010).

#### *The final stage towards decriminalisation*

The murder of three Auckland sex workers in 1996 and the rape of three Christchurch sex workers intensified the debate on the necessity to improve the safety of sex workers. The NZPC fought for a broader acceptance of the reality of sex work. It challenged arguments made by opponents by pointing to their lack of evidence-based content and by arguing that criminalisation would neither reduce the vulnerability of sex workers nor increase their safety. The decriminalisation model became feasible for the parliamentary process to create the PRB.

In October 2000, the PRB received its First Reading in Parliament and passed by 87 votes to 21. The Second Reading, in 2002, took place after a General Election, as a result of which parliament underwent a shift to the right. Both this shift and a stronger opposition were reflected in the vote: the PRB passed by 64 to 56. Two amendments that promoted criminalisation of the sector were defeated. An amendment to introduce a certification system for prostitution operators was accepted. What was remarkable about this amendment was that it banned immigrant sex workers from working in the sex industry, which, according to the NZPC, could lead to the emergence of an illegal circuit (Barnett, 2010, Abel, 2010).

Finally, on 25 June 2003, the aim of the NZPC was achieved. The PRA passed on a one-vote margin: 60-59, with one abstention. New Zealand thus became the first country in the world to decriminalise in- and outdoor sex work. This meant a switch from the double standard to an approach that focused on the improvement of the human rights as well as the health and safety of sex workers (Barnett et al., 2010).

*The impact of the decriminalisation policy and the continuing role of the NZPC*  
The most recent Prostitution Law Review in New Zealand shows that up until now the PRA has had a positive impact on the health and safety environment of sex workers. The feeling of being supported by the police and the justice system has empowered sex workers in their negotiations with clients and management. The general trend towards seeing sex workers as 'normal' women instead of pitiful, coerced victims has continued. However, stigmatisation has not disappeared and neither have coercion and exploitation (Weitzer, 2012, Fitzharris, 2010). The Review did not refer to any cases of trafficking, but the *Trafficking in Persons Report 2013* by the US Department of State found that New Zealand 'fails in having a comprehensive anti-trafficking law that prohibits all forms of trafficking' (Ministry of Justice, 2008, US Department of State, 2013). In a recent interview, Catherine Healy, National Coordinator of the NZPC, indicated that "the US-report is very focused on the US, and believes it should be the law in every country, even though that law does not suit local conditions". In her opinion, the US Report is biased and opposes decriminalisation.

Healy furthermore stated that throughout the last decade, the NZPC has continued to fight off attempts to either introduce the Swedish model (reconsidered by a Parliamentary Select Committee in 2013-14), to repeal the Act, or to make amendments designed to re-criminalise certain parts of the sex industry, such as street-based sex work. She expressed deep concerns about the section in the PRA that criminalises immigrant sex workers: "Working in the sex industry makes them illegal and vulnerable to exploitation. In its fight against illegality, the NZPC strives for a modification of this rule, without much result so far". She expressed optimism regarding the extent of the involvement of organised crime: "there is only little evidence of its involvement within the sex industry in New Zealand" (skype interview).

#### Conclusion

The decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand – with an important role played by the NZPC in bringing this about – has resulted in improvements with regard to the human rights as well as the health and safety of sex workers. The NZPC is nevertheless concerned about the stigmatisation of sex workers, the criminalisation of immigrant sex workers, and the efforts made by its opponents to partially re-criminalise sex work. My PhD-research focuses on the abovementioned issues as well as on the extent of the involvement of organised crime in the New Zealand sex industry.

#### References:

Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald, and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p.259-263.  
Barnett, T., Healy C., Reed A., Bennachie C., *Lobbying for decriminalization*, in: Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p. 60-6.  
Coney, Sandra, No equality between sexes while prostitution exists , *Sunday Star Times*, 12 August 2001.  
Healy, C., Bennachie, C., Reed, A., (2010), *History of the New Zealand Prostitutes' Collective*, in: Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p. 46-54.  
Jordan, Jan, *Of whalers, diggers and 'soiled doves': a history of the sex industry in New Zealand*, in: Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p. 35.  
Fitzharris, P., *Review of the Prostitution Reform Act*, in: Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p. 114-15.  
Laurie, A., *Several sides to this story: feminist views of prostitution reform*, in: Abel, Gillian, Lisa Fitzgerald and Catherine Healy, eds., *Taking the crime out of sex work: New Zealand sex workers' fight for decriminalisation*. Bristol, England: Policy Press, 2010, p. 88-90.  
Macdonald, Charlotte, *The 'Social Evil': Prostitution and the Passage of the Contagious Diseases Act (1869)*, in Barbara Brookes, Charlotte Macdonald

and Margaret Tennant (eds) *Women in History: Essays on European Women in New Zealand*, Wellington, 1986, p. 13-33.  
Ministry of Justice, *Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003*, Wellington, 2008.  
Mossman, E., *International approaches to decriminalising or legalising prostitution*, Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2007, p.6.  
Roguski, M., *Occupational Health and Safety of Migrant Sex Workers in New Zealand*, 2013.  
Sanders, T., O'Neill, M., Pitcher, J., *Prostitution: sex work, policy & politics*, London 2011, p. 99.  
Skype Interview, Catherine Healy and Joep Rottier, 10-04-2014.  
US Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2013*, p.279-281.  
Weitzer, R., *Legalizing prostitution. From illicit vice to lawful business*, New York, 2012, p. 97-100.

#### Risks of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults?

*Prof. Dr. Richard Staring, Erasmus University Rotterdam/ CIROC*

Young adults heading for Syria to join the jihad and the safety risks associated with their return are currently a topic of debate in the Netherlands and in many other European countries. Around 120 Dutch citizens have gone abroad to join the jihad and the Dutch government is concerned about the possible dangers these jihadists might pose to society when they return to the Netherlands. Over the past years, the Dutch security services have focused on Turkish religious and political organisations (among other groups) in the context of radicalism and extremism. More recently, Turkish self-organisations and the media have reported on social problems among Turkish-Dutch citizens, varying from socio-economic disadvantages and withdrawal into their own community to overrepresentation in crime statistics and increased risks of radicalisation. These reports have led to the present study, which focuses on questions regarding developments in the social position of Turkish-Dutch citizens in relation to possible risks of criminality and radicalisation among young adults of Turkish descent.

In order to answer these questions we conducted an extensive review of the literature on the social position of (second generation) Turkish-Dutch citizens and we examined how developments in the social position relate to criminality and radicalisation (and the risks thereof). In addition, empirical research was carried out. We conducted interviews with 27 professionals used to dealing with Turkish-Dutch citizens in the course of their work. We also interviewed 73 Turkish-Dutch young adults. Our sample included young adults who sympathized with or were involved in movements mentioned by the Dutch security service (AIVD) in relation to radicalisation, but did not include any strongly radicalised or extremist respondents.

#### *Developments in the socio-economic and socio-cultural positions*

A review of the literature reveals a level of ambiguity regarding the social position of Turkish-Dutch citizens in both socio-economic and socio-cultural areas. On the one hand, there have been positive developments, given that Turkish-Dutch citizens are catching up in many areas, especially in comparison to the indigenous population. On the other hand, they are (still) disadvantaged in all socio-economic areas (e.g. education, labour market, housing) when compared to the indigenous population and also, in a number of areas, in comparison to Surinamese, Antillean and Moroccan citizens. This gradual process of catching up makes it impossible to confirm or disprove the idea of an alarming state of affairs or a further falling behind, as reported by the media. A recurring theme in the literature, which was also emphasised during our interviews, concerns social exclusion and discrimination, or perceptions thereof. Such experiences could have a negative impact on the socio-economic position of Turkish-Dutch young people and may also pose an obstacle to the socio-cultural integration of Turkish-Dutch citizens.

#### *Social relations, identification and orientation*

There is a trend towards increasing ethnic heterogeneity in the social relationships of Turkish-Dutch citizens, particularly among second generation and higher educated Turks, but the inward focus remains strong, as

evidenced by the preference for marriage partners from within their own community. In terms of identification and orientation, Turkish-Dutch citizens are generally strongly focused on their Turkish identity and on Turkey, certainly in comparison to Antillean, Surinamese and Moroccan citizens. They also have stronger transnational ties than these other migrant groups, although in the case of highly educated second generation youngsters, identification with and orientation towards Turkey is often less strong. Most of the young adults we interviewed indicated that they felt more Turkish than Dutch, but at the same time they acknowledged that they had adopted many Dutch customs. A number of young adults identified more with Islam or the Kurdish cause than with their Turkish background. To a number of respondents, religion is more important than Turkish ethnicity when it comes to their sense of identity. Kurdish young adults prefer to describe themselves as 'Kurdish-Dutch citizens', rather than 'Turkish Kurds'. Despite their strong ties to Turkey, most of the young adults we interviewed preferred not to live there.

#### *Religion and political participation*

A review of the literature shows that the past decade has seen a religious revival, especially among second generation Turkish-Dutch citizens, as demonstrated by, for instance, an increase in mosque attendance. Both the literature and our interviews indicate that Turkish-Dutch citizens rate the importance of religion, and more specifically Islam, very highly. The majority of respondents interpret Islam as being related to their inner life and, more specifically, to finding consolation and the meaning of life. Only some respondents translated their religious convictions into political beliefs, without however feeling the need to put their political ideas into practice in an activist fashion. Turkish-Dutch citizens present an ambiguous picture with respect to political participation. On the one hand, they demonstrate political involvement by a relatively high level of participation in political self-organisations and local politics. On the other hand, they have little faith in Dutch political institutions and show little interest in Dutch national politics or Turkish politics. Kurdish-Dutch respondents are more politically active than Turkish-Dutch respondents: a number of them have participated in youth camps organised by the PKK and/or donated money, either directly or indirectly, to the PKK in Turkey.

#### *Risks of radicalisation: limited signs*

Only tentative estimates can be made with respect to the size and extent of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch citizens. First of all, it is not at all clear whether organisations that have caught the attention of the AIVD (such as the Fethullah Gülen movement or Milli Görüş) are actually radical movements. Various organisations with roots in Turkish politics and the Turkish diaspora, such as the religiously oriented Kaplan movement, the nationalist Grey Wolves and the left-wing separatist PKK, have all been characterised by the AIVD as radical. There are also a number of multi-ethnic Islamic movements with only some Turkish followers, such as Hizb ut Tahrir and jihadist Salafism, which is currently very much in the public eye. Estimates of the number of Turkish and Turkish-Dutch members rarely exceed more than a few dozen people, according to the AIVD's annual reports.

Considering the factors that have been linked to radicalisation, various predictions can be made regarding future risks of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults. On the one hand, an improvement in their socio-economic position may lead to a reduced risk of radicalisation. On the other hand, relative disadvantages still exist and relative deprivation may lead to radicalisation. From a socio-cultural viewpoint, a decreasing orientation towards Turkey could result in lower participation in specifically Turkish radical movements, but this tells us little about possible participation in multi-ethnic radical movements. Simultaneously, experiences of discrimination and the perception of living in (or between) two cultures could also increase the risk of radicalisation.

Questions regarding the actual risks of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults are difficult to answer. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, although a range of factors related to radicalisation can be identified from both the literature and the interviews, the nature of the correlations is unclear. Secondly, previous research has pointed to many factors that could have an effect on radicalisation, but no statements can be made regarding the relative weight of each of these

factors or how they affect, reinforce or counteract each other. Thirdly, explanatory studies of criminality point to similar if not the same factors as explanatory studies on radicalisation. All in all, it would seem that a variety of factors are at play in the emergence of radicalism and that developments in social position are in themselves insufficient to explain why young people resort to radicalism.

#### *Developments and factors inhibiting radicalisation*

In order to answer the question as to why Turkish-Dutch young adults rarely end up as extreme radicals, we distinguished several factors concerning (1) religious and political movements, (2) the close-knit nature of Turkish communities, (3) the internal emphasis on upward social mobility, (4) democratic convictions and (5) a tendency towards conformism. Whereas ideology and religion are often seen as important motivating factors for radicalisation, it could also be argued that the specific interpretations of ideology and religion in the Turkish communities act as a deterrent against radicalisation. The development of a secular Islam in modern Turkey in the twentieth century as well as the institutionalisation of Islam through mosque organisations such as the Diyanet, enable Turkish-Dutch young adults to be 'good Muslims' without the need for radicalisation. Turkish-Dutch young adults appear to take an increasingly pragmatic and individualistic approach to their faith, and secular Islam enables them to do so. Political organisations play a comparable role to religious organisations. Not only enables the Dutch political system immigrants and their descendants to participate fully in politics, but they can also realise their political ideals within the context of self-organisations.

It might very well be the case that the close-knit nature of the Turkish communities and a strong inward-looking focus offers Turkish-Dutch young adults a sense of security within their own group, resulting in less sensitivity to the judgements of the outgroup. This may contribute to a positive self-image and a sense of belonging that can mitigate feelings of social exclusion, being treated disrespectfully, and the perception of discrimination.

Thirdly, radicalisation may be counteracted by the largely positive perception that Turkish-Dutch young adults have of their own social position and the opportunities they see for the upward social mobility that they attach so much importance to, partly because of their upbringing. This emphasis on social mobility combined with experiences of relative success are likely to dissuade young people who have been trying – sometimes for years – to succeed in Dutch society, from behaviour and attitudes that are incompatible with their ambitions. Even the respondents who expressed an affinity with organisations that have been characterised in the past as radical are not necessarily on a path to radicalisation, extreme or otherwise. This is particularly evident in the case of the politically active Kurdish young adults whose involvement with the PKK had more of a social function: it was a mark of identity rather than a deed that could be interpreted as an act of radicalism or extremism. Furthermore, given their experiences, these young people were never activist enough to engage in radicalism.

In our conversations with Turkish-Dutch youngsters about their ambitions, we did not encounter many high-flown – let alone extreme – ideas or ideals but, rather, broadly shared and generally laudable goals such as a decent level of education, a responsible and well-paid job, a partner and/or children. The ambitions of Turkish-Dutch young adults appear to be quite similar to those of their indigenous counterparts, with the proviso that a sizable number of Turkish-Dutch young adults also want to be good Muslims. They combine these different efforts in a pragmatic fashion by aligning their religious ideals with more mundane goals such as success in society. Viewed from this perspective, Turkish-Dutch young adults probably resemble their Dutch counterparts more than they or, for that matter, Dutch society seem to realise.

#### *References:*

Staring, R., F. Geelhoed, G. Aslanoğlu, J. Hiah & M. Kox (2014). *Ontwikkelingen in de maatschappelijke positie van Turkse Nederlanders. Risico's op criminaliteit en radicalisering?*, Den Haag: Boom Lemma, 2014 (ISBN 978-94-6236-429-5)

With an extensive English summary downloadable from: <http://www.wodc.nl>

Fijnaut, C. (2014). *Criminology and the administration of criminal law* [Criminologie en strafrechtsbedeling]. Antwerpen: Intersentia., 924 pages, ISBN: 978-94-000-0466-5, € 79,90

Reviewed by Edwin Kruisbergen (WODC, Ministry of Security and Justice)


Cyrille Fijnaut has published a tremendous number of books, chapters and articles that cover an equally impressive range of topics. His work breathes knowledge of the English and Dutch as well as the Italian, German and French literature. Besides an international orientation, his work is characterized by a historicizing approach. Without knowledge of its history, one cannot understand the development of criminology. According to Fijnaut, many contemporary introductions to criminology suffer from a lack of historical perspective. In order to fill this gap Fijnaut wrote *Criminology and the administration of criminal law*, a ‘historical transatlantic’ introduction to criminology. Starting in the 16th century, it describes the history of criminology – or rather the history of thought on crime and punishment – in Western Europe and the United States. Since the book’s scope is much broader than the focus of this newsletter, I have limited myself to the pieces on organized crime, some theoretical pieces, as well as the introductory and concluding chapters. According to the author, changes in crime are one of the driving forces in the development of criminology. If the nature or extent of crime becomes a problem in the eye of the public, policymakers or interest groups, a need for criminological research will arise. Concerns about organized crime, for example, served as such an impetus for research. The material on organized crime is part of a section on sociologically oriented criminology. After parts that deal with theories such as the differential association theory and the anomie theory, Fijnaut discusses the ‘sociology of organized crime’. This part is mainly based on the work of Thrasher and Landesco as well as on research instigated by the American Congress, e.g. the studies of Kefauver and McClellan. Thrasher’s *The gang* (1927) brought organized crime to the attention of criminologists and jurists. In Chicago youth gangs and gangs that were at the heart of organized crime were strongly interrelated. So-called Mastergangs had political connections, acted violently against adversaries, and organized their illegal activities efficiently as if they were running a regular business. In the same period, John Landesco conducted his Illinois crime survey. He mainly focused on the Torrio-Capone syndicate in Chicago. Despite these studies and the size of the problem, there was little support in Congress for a firm federal approach. This did not change until the 1950s, when the American Senate launched a committee of inquiry, chaired by Kefauver. Kefauver’s worrying findings were confirmed by other studies, such as those of McClellan on organized crime involvement in labour unions. Fijnaut dedicates a separate section to Sutherland’s White collar crime. According to Fijnaut, this famous work was nothing less than revolutionary. It redefined the core of criminology by asking the question: what is crime? Sutherland wrote about the corporate crimes committed by seventy of the largest companies in the United States. The hegemonic power of these companies allowed them to prevent being subjected to criminal investigation. It also prevented that their misdeeds became known to the general public or were labelled as criminal. Fijnaut notes that Sutherland unintentionally delivered proof for this hegemonic power. In fear of expensive legal procedures started by the white collar criminals described in his book, he deleted their names as well as some case studies. In his final chapter Fijnaut concludes that since the 1980s criminology has become a ‘booming business’. The expansion of criminological research runs the risk of fragmentation. This is where the author again addresses organized crime. Fijnaut argues for discussion on the object of criminological research to prevent criminology from fragmenting into ‘a thousand single issues’ and ignoring the link between seemingly separate themes, such as the effect of organized crime on living conditions in cities, the relation between corruption and organized crime, and the link between terrorism and organized crime.

The rest of the book does not really deal with organized crime as a separate subject (apart from banditism in earlier centuries). This is probably connected to the fact that the author only briefly discusses criminological research of the last decades, at least in comparison with his in-depth analysis of prior history. This might be because more recent research, concepts and theories and their interaction with society are simply of lesser importance. It might also be that it is harder to pinpoint the scientific, societal and historical meaning of more recent work, especially given its high level of differentiation. To find out, we would have to wait until another scholar dares to engage in the ambitious task of writing a history of criminology. However, that may take a while, since Fijnaut has set the bar very high. His *Criminology and the administration of criminal law* not only has an impressive historical, international, as well as substantive scope, it is also very well written.

In my opinion – although I have only focused on specific parts of the book – the reader will not be disappointed, especially readers who are not so much looking for a regular introduction to criminology, but would rather like to know more about the history of criminological thought and criminological thinkers.

### Recent Publications on Organized Crime in the Netherlands (selection):

- Huisman, W. & E.R. Kleemans (2014). The challenges of fighting sex trafficking in the legalized prostitution market of the Netherlands. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 61(2): 215-228.
- Kleemans, E.R. (2013). Organized crime and the visible hand: a theoretical critique on the economic analysis of organized crime. *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 13(5): 615-629.
- Kleemans, E.R., & M. de Boer (2013). Italian Mafia in the Netherlands. In: Special issue ‘Mafia and Social Perception in Italy and Abroad’, edited by Ernesto Savona and Maurizio Esposito. *Security and Social Science* 1(3): 15-29.
- Kleemans, E.R., E.W. Kruisbergen & R.F. Kouwenberg (2014). Women, brokerage and transnational organized crime. Empirical results from the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor. *Trends in Organized Crime* 17(1-2): 16-30.
- Leun, J.P. van der & Staring, R.H.J.M. (2013). Human Smuggling. In G.J.N. Bruinsma & D.L. Weisburd (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice* (pp. 2382-2389). New York: Springer Science and Business Media
- Siegel, D. (2013) Women in transnational organized crime. *Trends in Organized Crime*, June, DOI 10.1007/s12117-013-9206-4 (online)
- Siegel, D. (2014) *Mobile banditry. East and Central European Itinerant Criminal Groups in the Netherlands*, The Hague: Eleven International Publishing.
- Siegel, D. and H. Van de Bunt (2013), Underground Banking, in: Calderoni, F. and S. Canapelle (eds.) *Organized Crime, Corruption, and Crime Prevention - Essays in Honor of Ernesto U. Savona*, New York: Springer.
- Soudijn, M.R.J. *Using strangers for money: a discussion on money-launderers in organized crime*. *Trends in Organized Crime* 03/2014, pp. 199-217.



## COLOFON

### Editorial

Chief Editor: Prof. Dr. Dina Siegel-Rozenblit

### CIROC

Willem Pompe Institute, Utrecht University  
Boothstraat 6, 3512 BM Utrecht  
The Netherlands

Email: [ciroc@uu.nl](mailto:ciroc@uu.nl)  
Tel. +31 30 2537125

Fax. +31 30 2537128  
[www.ciroc.org](http://www.ciroc.org)